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Drawing on ethnographic research in Houston, Texas, I explore how private equity financiers in the US hydrocarbon industry are empowered to define
and take financial risks on our collective behalf. The US shale revolution could not have unfolded without the financial risk-taking activities of private
equity financiers who channeled billions of dollars into US unconventional exploration and production (“fracking”). These financiers are motivated not
only by their own capitalist projects but also by feelings of responsibility to take financial risks for the benefit of others. Shedding light on this enigmatic
community, I attend to the relatively neglected area of hydrocarbon finance and highlight how perceptions of financial risk and responsibility become
entangled to shape our collective energy present(s) and future(s). As an essential piece of the financial infrastructure that connects investors around
the world with US hydrocarbon activities, I suggest that private equity firms are conduits not only of capital but also of responsibility.
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Revered by many in US hydrocarbon finance as the “cowboys” of financial risk and reward, private equity (PE)
financiers provide a way for institutional investors, such as colleges and pension funds, to invest in companies
that are not traded on stock exchanges (Souleles 2017, 2019).1 In the oil and gas sector, PE financiers have played
and continue to play a central role in funding the US “shale revolution” through small to medium exploration
and production (E&P) companies specializing in unconventional extraction (colloquially known as fracking). The
financial rewards of hydrocarbon E&P can be massive, multiplying the value of investments by several times over
the span of a few years.2 Investors, however, risk losing everything they invest—the quantity and composition of
hydrocarbon reserves underground are often uncertain, and the value of these reserves fluctuates with commodity
prices (Watts 2015).3 Many PE interlocutors described their high-risk, high-reward investment activities as “fun”
and told me that they enjoyed the thrill of “chasing oil.” Many also described being animated by deep-seated feelings
of responsibility—responsibility to use their financial expertise to take risks to generate profit for their institutional
investors, to financially support their employees, and to advance “American capitalism.” Arthur, a managing partner
at a successful medium-sized oil and gas PE firm in Houston, whom I got know, explained:
I feel an enormous sense of responsibility. … Our investors are primarily college endowments or pension
funds. That’s not something you take lightly. I genuinely think about the fact that we’re taking this money from
such-and-such university. They’re believing in us. They’re investing with us in our projects. If I lose their money,
it’s very bad for the university, very bad for scholarship programs and infrastructure on campus. If I can grow this
money, there’s a lot of good that can be done with this. Same for pension funds. These are people’s retirements.
(interview, August 29, 2020)
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He saw it as his professional responsibility to take financial risks to make profits where other financiers would not.
He told me, “That’s our job. To say, Hey, this is a risky asset. This is a risky area, a risky proposition. We’re going to
take on that risk.”
A growing pool of work on finance has shown how risk taking is a formative part of financial expertise
(Miyazaki 2013; Oritz 2013; Tripathy 2017; Zaloom 2004). According to Zaloom (2004, 365), Chicago Board of
Trade commodity traders forge a “productive life of risk” by combining aggressive risk taking with routinization
to perform a “kind of alchemy” that turns the buying and selling of futures contracts into profits. She argues that
it is “their responsibility” as experts to voluntarily and actively “engage with risk” to produce profit, not simply
heed caution in the face of potential financial losses and personal financial ruin (Zaloom 2004, 366, 383). In a
similar vein, Miyazaki (2007, 2013) has documented how Japanese traders actively engage with risk through the
practice of financial arbitrage—the practice of buying and selling identical (or similar) securities in two different
markets and profiting off the price differential. Traders enthusiastically engage with the financial risks of arbitrage
not only to generate profit but also because these traders believe in the “power of money” to positively make the
Japanese economy more “efficient” (Miyazaki 2013, 15, 51–52). According to Miyazaki (2013, 92–93), arbitrageurs
internalize their role as the “strong individuals” who are “willing to take on risks and responsibility” to seize
economic opportunities, provision their own well-being, and usher in free-market reforms for the perceived benefit
of the Japanese economy. What these scholars demonstrate is that various forms of financial expertise are entwined
with feelings of responsibility to materialize capitalist outcomes that have personal as well as broader socioeconomic
significance.
In the oil and gas literature, a few scholars have explored how experts actively engage with financial risks in
pursuit of profits. Johnson (2015), for example, shows how the financialization of disaster risk moved from the realm
of insurance into tradable derivative contracts after a series of hurricanes and the 2010 BP Gulf of Mexico explosion.
While insurance is meant to indemnify the financial risks associated with weather and accidents, futures contracts
for oil and weather, she shows, allow speculators and hedgers to bet on the potentiality of disaster—turning the
possibility of destructive weather events and accidents into something that is profitably traded and speculated on.
In another vein, Mason (2007, 368) explains that calculating financial risk in the oil and gas industry has become
central to conceptualizing “all loci of uncertainty while increasing the chance of economic success.”
He shows that expert financial consultants have become central to this practice of risk conceptualization and
speculation because they present “an objectivized view of how the industry operates” that can be marketed to
investors in terms of financial risk–reward ratios (Mason 2007, 368–69). Wood (2016, 2019), meanwhile, has
shown that investments in small- to medium-sized oil companies create shared moral horizons between investors
and managers. These horizons are shaped as much by hopes of future profits as by financial managers’ feelings
of “commitment, responsibility and perseverance” (Wood 2019, 83) to be good stewards of capital in the face of
financial risks and uncertain economic outcomes. Geology and finance, Wood (2016) shows, become entangled in
the process of “derisking” hydrocarbon reserves to be exploited for future expected profitability.
This article advances the anthropological literatures on US PE finance (Ho 2009; Souleles 2017, 2019) and the
US hydrocarbon industry (Appel, Mason, and Watts 2015; High 2019, forthcoming-a, forthcoming-b; Mason 2007;
Wood 2016; 2019) by exploring the intersection of high finance with unconventional onshore oil and gas exploration.
I frame my discussion in terms of the ethical entanglement of financial risk and social responsibility. While I explore
the calculative practices and financial methodologies deployed in hydrocarbon finance elsewhere (Field, n.d.), in
this article, I focus on PE financiers in particular and the crucial role they play in advancing financially risky forms
of energy extraction, specifically, how interlocutors I know in this area of finance see it as their responsibility to take
financial risks to advance US hydrocarbon capitalism using unconventional extraction techniques. By channeling
billions of dollars into unconventional E&P companies, Arthur and his peers’ ethical disposition to take financial
risk turned a sunset industry in the United States, with most of its onshore oil resources extracted at the turn of the
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millennium, into an expanding sector in the midst of a technological renaissance. In the process, these PE financiers
profoundly changed our collective energy landscapes by unlocking previously unthinkable quantities of oil and gas
(Haines 2013a; McLean 2018; US Energy Information Administration [USEIA] 2020).
To make my argument, I draw on ethnographic field research that I have conducted with oil and gas financiers
in Houston, Texas, since late 2018. My interlocutors include PE partners, managing directors, bankers, lawyers,
accountants, consultants, and engineers engaged in the practice of energy investing and lending (most in senior and
leadership positions). They let me into their offices, their homes, and their lives,4 enabling me to carry out interviews,
participate in private industry events, “hang out” with them socially, and observe the oil finance sector from inside
its close-knit social circles, which cut across firms. Understanding the people in this enigmatic “petroculture” of
financial capitalism and the work they perform is as important as understanding the extractive technologies that
produce energy, because the speed and expansiveness by which these extractive technologies are deployed are
dependent on how they are capitalized and the financiers who capitalize them (Labban 2008; Wilson, Carlson, and
Szeman 2017).
Risk and responsibility
The concepts of risk and responsibility in the anthropological literature on oil and gas are frequently framed within
the context of corporate social responsibility (CSR), moral imperatives, and the need to mitigate environmental
contamination. CSR, scholars have shown, allows corporations to pursue capitalist political economic objectives
while diffusing responsibility for poor business practices and reinforcing unequal gift relations in the communities
where they operate (Cross 2014; High, forthcoming-a; Rajak 2011). Responsibility has also been framed in terms of
accountability for the negative anthropogenic impact that fossil fuel production and consumption have on people
and the environment (Hughes 2017). For Hughes (2017, 14–15, 62), the “great evil of dumping carbon dioxide
in the skies” through fossil fuel consumption requires a “moral reckoning” whereby responsibility for the risks
posed by anthropogenic climate change must be assigned to those working in the hydrocarbon industry and those
“complicit” in the consumptive petroculture economies of the world. In another strain of this literature, risk and
responsibility are framed as the responsibility to avoid or mitigate the environmental and health risks associated with
the toxicity of hydrocarbon production (Wylie 2015). What ties this literature together is that it frames responsibility
in terms of accountability for untoward consequences and to mitigate various risks—from anthropogenic to health
to socioeconomic—distinguishing it from scholarly work on financial risk.
The conceptual pairing of individual responsibility to take financial risks in pursuit of financial rewards has
been around in various forms for a long time. Hawley (1893), for example, conceptualized risk taking as a factor
of capitalist production alongside the classical economic factors of land, labor, and capital. He argued that what
distinguishes profitable enterprises from nonprofitable ones are individuals’ entrepreneurial appetites for risk
taking. Knight ([1921] 1964) advanced this risk theory of profit by arguing that it is entrepreneurs’ ability to take
financial risks on uncertain futures that is the source of capitalist profits. More recently, Appadurai (2011, 2016) has
taken up this conceptualization of risk and uncertainty in his analysis of the spirit and mechanics of short-selling
derivatives. For Appadurai, it is financial speculators’ capacity to take speculative financial risks on exploiting
uncertain futures that allows them to earn profits where others will not. This narrow focus on the financial risks
and rewards of exploiting uncertain futures rarely enters anthropological literature on energy, and fossil fuels in
particular, most likely because of the various and complex ways that risk can be conceived.
Some of the closest scholarly work in this vein is Weszkalnys’s (2015) exploration of “first oil” in São Tomé and
Príncipe. With the blessing of state actors and help of technical experts whose job it is to estimate the uncertainties
of hydrocarbon production, Weszkalnys (2015, 625) shows that profit-seeking “risk-taking entrepreneurs” play
a central role in E&P activities in the country. Wood’s (2016, 2019) ethnography of a small Canadian E&P
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company is particularly insightful. She shows that hydrocarbon E&P entails grappling with multiple externalized
and internalized risks—ranging from market price volatility to competing corporate practices of evaluating the
financial worth of hydrocarbons deep underground. These financial risks not only threaten investors’ capital but
are entangled with the moral obligation of managers to return capital to shareholders in ways that challenge
their durational ethics of responsibility and commitment (Wood 2016). The point that Wood (2019) makes is
that the disposition of these managers toward risk and responsibility can be conceptualized as a kind of “energy
ethics,” one that has broad-based implications that transverse “awkward scales” and ethical worlds (Comaroff and
Comaroff 2003). For High and Smith (2019, 10, 20), on whom Wood draws, “energy ethics” draws attention to how
people make sense of energy in terms of what they consider to be “right and good,” and the contradictions therein,
without endorsing the standpoints of interlocutors or their ethical worlds.
The way that Arthur describes his personal sense of responsibility to take financial risks on the uncertainties of
E&P is a kind of energy ethics. It resembles the notion of using his agency as a financial expert to act “on behalf of
another” to yield envisioned future outcomes (Laidlaw 2014, 188; see also Raffoul 2018). This conception of agential
responsibility is not limited to the causal efficacy of people to be held responsible or liable for adverse or unforeseen
outcomes—Arthur’s sense of responsibility does not gaze into the past, nor is his agential sense of responsibility
rendered through his opposition to “systems of value and power” (Laidlaw 2014, 182). Instead, his sense of ethical
responsibility to take financial risks is forward looking and gazes toward materializing envisioned outcomes that
are rooted in the (re)production of the fossil fuel economy and financial modes of capitalism, much in the same
vein described by Wood (2016, 2019). His disposition is suggestive of what Laidlaw (2014, 181) calls the “complex
processes of the attribution of responsibility” that expose the connected and ethical dimensions of human actions.
Indeed, as a social relationship, the ethical responsibility to take risks to yield capitalist outcomes is internalized
by interlocutors like Arthur as part of what they see as their identities as PE financiers, in ways similarly described by
Zaloom (2004) and Miyazaki (2013). This forward-looking disposition to take financial risks on behalf of others res-
onates with Ortiz’s (2013, 2014) account of French fund managers trading financial securities for their institutional
investor clients. By taking responsibility for trading securities on behalf of institutional investors, fund managers
take a forward-looking disposition to meet particular capitalist financial goals connected to material outcomes in
ways that locate “political responsibility” for these outcomes, not with investors, but with financiers (Ortiz 2013,
76). Thus, responsibility is also something that is placed on them, through contractual agreement and the exchange
of capital, by their institutional clients. The ethical entanglement of investors, investment managers, and the objects
of their investments may be characterized as part of capitalist credit relationships that tie people and groups
together well into the future, binding them to envisioned capitalist outcomes (Graeber 2012; Harvey [1982] 2016).
In the anthropological literature on oil and gas, there are few examples of how entwined perceptions of
financial risk, financial reward, and responsibility—especially among those in positions of power—constitute a
formative part of the petrocultures of financial capitalism. In the sections that follow, I map the role of PE in the
US hydrocarbon industry, show how risk is narrowly framed in geofinancial terms, and explore the ways my PE
interlocutors conceptualize their ethical sense of responsibility in their professional roles to shape our energy worlds.
Private equity and US E&P
Private investors have played a central role in the US oil industry by financing small E&P companies since the
industry was founded more than a century ago. In the first part of the twentieth century, a limited number of
bankers were willing to risk losing depositors’ life savings on loans secured by prospective oil reserves as “collateral
that could neither be measured nor seen” (Clark 2016, 43).5 Greater technological sophistication in estimating
potential oil reserves expanded commercial reserve-based lending to independent oil producers beginning in the
1950s, but lending practices rarely provide all the capital E&P companies require (Clark 2016; High, forthcoming-b).
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The introduction and expansion of alternative financing schemes in the twentieth century creatively provided capital
to E&P companies beyond what commercial lending would provide. However, many small- to medium-sized E&P
companies have been, and continue to be, reliant on private investors to fund operations—a gap that PE firms bridge
by connecting investors with companies. The preference of oil and gas PE firms to invest in smaller, start-up E&P
companies is part of what distinguishes this subsector from the broader US PE sector covered by Souleles (2019),
which has historically preferred larger, mature corporations.
PE firms provide capital for what are considered financially risky investments in the oil and gas industry.
By contrast with owning stocks in publicly traded companies, for which shares can be bought and sold through
exchange houses, owning PE means owning shares in private companies. Private companies do not have to regularly
publish financial details or comply with regulations stipulated by regulatory bodies like the US Security and
Exchange Commission. This not only makes what these companies do and how much they profit more secretive but
also means they can take greater financial risks than the regulators and shareholders of public companies might allow
(High, forthcoming-b; Souleles 2019). PE managers, who buy and sell shares in these private companies on behalf of
investors, use proprietary information to carefully evaluate potential investment opportunities, which interlocutors
tell me requires “boots on the ground” and “deep” local knowledge that is not publicly known.6
The first oil and gas–specific PE firms in the United States were established in the late 1980s in Texas.7
Houston-based EnCap and Enervest and Dallas-headquartered Natural Gas Partners were the pioneers of this
genre of PE in the United States. Established by experienced commercial oil and gas bankers, an interlocutor
joked that the founders of these firms were a “bunch of unemployed bankers” who turned oil and gas PE into
something that “you can make a lot of money” doing (interview, November 18, 2019). At first, they acted as private
lenders and consultants, but they soon crafted a model to buy direct equity ownership in small- to medium-sized
private companies, grow the prospective hydrocarbon assets of these companies, then sell these assets to larger
companies to further exploit them, a process that my interlocutors called the “food chain” (see Wood 2016).
Now numbering in the dozens, these US PE firms (many located in Texas, Houston in particular) compete with
investment banks, such as JP Morgan and Goldman Sachs, to raise PE funds, then invest money from these funds
into companies. Minimum investments can range from hundreds of thousands of dollars to tens of millions of
dollars per investment, and funds can have targeted fund-raising goals ranging from several million to several
billion dollars (Ho 2009; McLean 2018; Souleles 2019).
The US PE financiers whom I know from my fieldwork specialize in onshore US unconventional oil and gas E&P.
The problem with onshore US unconventional E&P, my interlocutors said, is finding profitable (or “economic”; Field,
n.d.; Wood 2016) reserves. For my interlocutors, this was the “right” kind of financial risk, marketable to institutional
investors. It is perceived as “safer” because E&P happens in the United States and involves exploiting known onshore
hydrocarbon reserves previously inaccessible with conventional extraction technology. Kyle, a contemporary of
Arthur’s, explained that offshore profit margins “are great when it works” but that investors are “making a huge
bet on the exploration side” (interview, September 23, 2019). Kyle was a banker with one of the United States’ top
investment banks before cofounding his own oil and gas PE firm in Houston, Texas. The combination of horizontal
drilling and hydraulic fracturing was an “unbelievable success” that could be marketed to institutional investors,
Kyle explained:
You’re seeing reservoirs that were once dead, considered dead and obsolete, resurrected. Rock that you wanted to
avoid is now “a shale.” … It truly changed the game. … In the “shale game,” you are going in and you are buying
areas of land that we have a very good idea, from a geology standpoint, that the rock has hydrocarbons in it. It is
just a matter of how productive that is going to be. (interview, August 25, 2020)
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Figure 1 Risk–return matrix example: a reproduction by the author of similar visual diagrams collected during fieldwork.
The acronyms represent stages of oil and gas E&P: PDP is “proven developed producing,” PDNP is “proven developed not
producing,” and PUD is “proven but undeveloped.” Mezzanine debt is loaned capital that can include a wide range of
repayment features for the lender, including interest payments, royalty rights, and equity shares. Development loans are for
the drilling of proven oil and gas reserves. Second lien debt is debt collateralized to an asset that is already collateralized with
another loan. A Drillco is a kind of joint venture where an investor enters into an agreement with an E&P company to fund the
drilling of a specified number of wells in exchange for a share of the value of those wells.
The financial risk PE managers take with investor’s money, he said, is betting on how much can be potentially
extracted using this “relatively new way of producing oil and gas.” Their skill as PE financiers is twofold: to find
and bet on E&P prospects that will yield their target rates of profitability and, as Kyle explained, to “convince our
investors” that investing in E&P is “a smart risk and reward trade.” Figure 1 is an example of the risk–reward
diagrams that Kyle and other interlocutors use when consulting potential investors. These depictions are useful
for conveying expectations of financial risks and rewards to investors that have little or no experience investing
in hydrocarbon E&P. Moreover, they help investors conceptualize oil and gas resources as financial objects to be
exploited. In these representations, PE finance is situated on the vanguard of the risk–return spectrum, where target
rates of return are higher.
Other forms of finance tend to target “proven” operations in the oil and gas industry by focusing on established
businesses with producing, rather than potential, hydrocarbon reserves. Commercial lenders, Kyle explained, have
been and continue to be unwilling to lend capital for “exploration plays” not only because if exploration fails, their
loans default, but also because they have no financial incentive to do so. If an unconventional prospect turns out to
be hugely profitable, lenders will only get their contractual principal and interest. PE investors, meanwhile, stand to
benefit from the entirety of the profit-making potential of prospective hydrocarbon reserves. On the vanguard, PE
firms and their portfolio companies specialize in proving the “potentiality” of reserves and their future profitability,
where profitability is “less a concrete number” and more a geofinancial probability imbued with capitalist hopes and
dreams (Miyazaki 2013; Weszkalnys 2015, 617; Wood 2016, 45). Risk, meanwhile, is narrowly defined as financial
risk (i.e., loss) associated with uncertainties of E&P.
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Derisking shale
For my PE interlocutors, being on the vanguard of the risk–reward spectrum in oil and gas finance pridefully
combines the skill and prestige of “high finance,” akin to “front-office” investment banking, with the entrepreneurial
wildcatter spirit long associated with the US onshore oil industry (High, forthcoming-b; Ho 2009). It involves
proving the potentiality of hydrocarbon reserves, a process that interlocutors call “derisking.” Speaking with me
at his office in early 2019, Arthur told me that his firm excelled at “derisking” (interview, January 23, 2019). We sat
at a long blackboard table; one side of the boardroom had a glass wall that looked out into the firm’s main lobby and
reception area, adorned in a black-and-white modernist decor. Some large, black-and-white maps of the continental
United States sprawled on the table, checkered with colorful shapes and dots that highlighted oil and gas formations
and wells. As we were talking, he pointed to a colored region on one of the large maps on the table and explained,
“We’re going to go spend money to derisk it, so that somebody else can come along and say, ‘I see what you did here.
I can see that these wells work’” (interview, January 23, 2019).
The idea of “derisking” was reiterated frequently by interlocutors and encapsulates the idea of making the poten-
tiality of hydrocarbon reserves known, then “redomaining” these largely untapped reserves as financial objects with
future economic value that can be sold (High 2019, 32; Shever 2012, 78). It implies exposing investors to the uncer-
tainties of E&P and can be located in the time between when prospective mineral-acreage rights are purchased (or
leased) and when profitable extraction and production can be proven. In this time, “a heterogeneous set of practices”
ranging from seismic mapping to drilling test wells to estimating and valuing the size of hydrocarbon-accessible
reserves are deployed to prove the existence of geological matter that can be profitably exploited for the purpose
of capitalism (Weszkalnys 2015, 617). This process of actively taking financial risks in E&P is broader in definition
than the risks associated with buying and selling derivatives contracts or financial arbitrage, because E&P involves a
whole set of activities associated with redomaining (or recommodifying) the biophysical world (Weszkalnys 2015).
Combining technical expertise with financial expertise to turn unseen hydrocarbon containing rock into future
expected profits is the creative “alchemy” in oil and gas finance (Zaloom 2004, 365). Arthur’s portfolio E&P
companies that are responsible for executing this material set of heterogeneous derisking practices are akin to the
Challenge Energy company documented by Wood (2016, 2019). The financial value of these companies and their
hydrocarbon assets is dependent on convincingly turning these assets that cannot be seen, touched, or smelled into
net present values (NPVs), based on future estimated discounted cash flows, that can be sold (Wood 2016).
Rick explained to me that “derisking” E&P is where the “big” money is, and it is where PE finance forged a
name for itself during the shale revolution (interview, March 5, 2019). Rick is a senior executive in the industry who
works with PE firms and has decades of experience. He explained that the story of the shale revolution has two major
components: a technological component and a financial component. Technology turned financially “worthless” land
into something that hydrocarbons could be extracted from, he told me. The financial side of the story is how PE
firms like Arthur’s saw an opportunity to fund independent oil and gas companies to use this technology to “derisk”
unconventional extraction and “redomain” this land (and the hydrocarbon deposits underneath) into new financial
assets. He broke the story down into three phases:
The first stage is what we call “prove it.” This is the stage where people are going to drill wells, maybe verticals,
maybe horizontals. … All they’re trying to do is show that a reservoir is going to cough up some oil or gas in
sufficient quantities. … The next stage is what we call the “optimization stage.” Now, the cat’s out of the bag, and
you, and everybody, runs around and it explodes! Now, people are trying wells over here, and wells over there,
and twenty miles away, and two hundred miles away … discovering where is it good, where is it bad, and what’s
the best way to drill and complete these wells. … We have now reached a phase where pretty much every major
play has a third stage, called “standardization.” There is very little risk left. We basically know how to drill and
complete these things. … I just got a whole lot of wells to drill. Ten thousand, twenty [thousand], fifty thousand,
one hundred thousand of these wells yet to be invested in. This phase is mostly about trying to get your cost
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down. It’s cookie cutter. … It’s very different from the cowboy phase … where I take a chance to buy some
acreage over here for 750 dollars [per acre] and hope it turns into 20,000 dollars an acre. Now everybody knows
that over there actually it didn’t work and it’s still 500 an acre. This over here has been dynamite, it’s 40,000 dollars
an acre!
The risk–reward ratios of the “prove it” and “cowboy optimization” phases are massive, and that is why PE firms
focus on this part of the oil industry, Rick said. “It’s very much a risk–reward ratio.”
From 2004 until 2008, a few oil and gas–specific PE firms that were in the “right basins” at the “right time”
dominated this subsector of finance. During this period, big oil and gas companies developed “an obsession,” as
one interlocutor put it, with growing their inventory of drilling prospects “derisked” by PE firms because they
did not want to miss out on what many saw as a renaissance in the US oil industry. When the 2008–9 global
financial crisis (GFC) happened, oil and gas PE ascended in popularity among institutional investors because
interest-bearing investments and other investment vehicles were performing poorly in the wake of the GFC (St.
Louis Federal Reserve 2020; USEIA 2020). While the typical time horizon for PE investments ranges from three
to seven years, this horizon shifted to three to five years during this phase because demand for these “derisked”
prospects meant proven prospects could easily and quickly be sold. These horizons were financially motivated
and decoupled from the expected material life of unconventional wells, except for their expected NPV. Jacob,
a managing director of oil and gas lending for a large multinational corporation that works with PE firms,
explained,
You had a declining interest rate environment. You had these big pension funds out there looking for ways
to hit their actuarial return targets. … It’s a recipe for private equity to just be a huge force in terms of an
asset class, and the window was wide open in the E&P space, given what was going on with shale. (interview,
December 13, 2019)
With few investment vehicles in which to make their target returns, investors channeled billions of dollars into
PE firms, hoping to capitalize on what many “prayed” would be the next meteoric rise in oil prices (Haines 2013a,
2013b). As Oil and Gas Investor magazine’s 2013 special issue on PE, subtitled “Money Well Spent” (Figure 2),
exclaimed, “the institutional investor crowd love energy and the kinds of returns it can deliver” (Haines 2013a, 4).
By contrast, with just a few PE firms specializing in E&P prior to 2008, 379 PE firms were funding approximately
300 E&P companies in the United States near the peak of the second phase in 2013 (Haines 2013a, 4).8 Newly
established PE firms, like Arthur’s and Kyle’s, had amassed hundreds of millions of dollars of institutional
investments, while well-established PE firms continued to raise multibillion-dollar E&P funds. Blackstone, for
example, raised a $4.5 billion energy fund in February 2015, only three years after raising a fund of $2.4 billion
(Kumar 2015), and EnCap raised its twentieth fund (Capital Fund XI), worth $7 billion, in 2017 (EnCap 2020).9
Between 2015 and 2019, US PE firms spent $64 billion, of which $44 billion was spent on unconventional E&P
in the United States—fundamentally transforming the US energy landscape and the global Anthropocene in ways
that are not yet fully apparent (Flowers 2019; Kumar 2015).
Shifting responsibilities
Although the price of oil fell precipitously in late 2014, oil and gas PE firms continued to fund raise, money
continued to pour in from institutional investors, and PE managers forged ahead with derisking. The problem is
that in the $40 to low-$50 per barrel price range, which persisted between 2014 and 2019, it was difficult for PE
firms and their portfolio companies to meet their profitability targets, interlocutors told me. The other problem was
that with so many PE firms competing to prove the potential economic value of unconventional reserves, there were
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Figure 2 The cover of a special “Private Equity”
edition of Oil and Gas Investor magazine, November
2013. Reproduced with permission.
fewer and fewer resources to be “derisked.” The flurry of PE-fueled E&P activity had “derisked” the most lucrative
acreage—exposing where unconventional extraction was profitable and where it was not. By 2019, the big oil compa-
nies at the top of the “food chain” that PE firms depend on stopped buying their “derisked” unconventional reserves
because, as one interlocutor explained, the big companies “got full up on acreage” (interview, January 22, 2019). The
oil and gas PE model that dominated the industry for more than a decade completely broke down. Then, the fall in
oil prices in early 2020 pushed the entire US hydrocarbon industry into a full-scale retraction (High and Field 2020;
USEIA 2020).
Talking with me in mid-2020, after the downturn and historic plummet in the price of US oil, Kyle told me, “It’s
not an easy situation. … All of our companies are underwater” (interview, August 25, 2020), by which he meant
the financial value of his companies and investors’ capital in them had all been wiped out. Now, Kyle was trying
to balance his multiple responsibilities—to his employees, to his investors, and to his own capitalist project. He
admitted that he had to make some “difficult decisions.” He explained,
If we make them money, then we get money. That’s not going to happen on any of our companies today based
on where they are at, and what’s happened in the industry. It would be very easy, or tempting I should say, …
economically rational … for my partner and I to say, “Listen, we’re not going to make money. We’re out.” That’s
not what we’re doing. That’s not what we’ve done. We feel an obligation to our investors to do the best that we can
to generate the best returns as we possibly can. That’s what we’ve been focused on and that’s what we’re continuing
to do for our investors.
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As Wood (2019, 83) notes, “oil at … the end of profit” involves a slightly different set of moral responsibilities
than it does at the beginning of an oil boom. Instead of moral horizons full of promise and potentiality of profit, oil
at the end of profit tests individuals’ sense of responsibility to persevere in the face of dismal financial outcomes,
failed promises, and future uncertainty. Kyle is an example of this; once ignited by a sense of responsibility to use
his financial expertise to generate profits, he now saw it as his responsibility, indeed, his moral “obligation,” to
proceed with E&P to minimize losses for his investors. It has been “very painful,” he said, with strain in his voice,
followed by a long sigh.
Speaking with me around the same time, Arthur told me that his firm had managed to weather the crisis that
had swept across the industry in the last twelve months. A handful of committed investors and some price hedging
had given Arthur’s firm an edge over some of their competitors. It had not been easy, however; during a meeting
with some of his institutional investors to review their fund performance, he told me he nervously watched the
price of oil plummet on his phone, eroding the asset valuations his team was in the midst of presenting. He takes
his responsibility to balance risk and reward and to maximize his investors’ capital seriously; he explained, “I really
do think about that. Just the responsibility that comes with that” (interview, January 23, 2019). For him, being a PE
financier is not just about maximizing investor capital and fulfilling his own capitalist goals—although these are
priorities; he saw his work contributing to a greater national and global good. “We are producing hydrocarbons that
are able to be used here in America,” and fossil fuel production, he told me, reduces “poverty across the world” by
creating wealth and making energy more inexpensive. Overall, “I think that what we are doing is good.” For me,
Arthur’s reflections are reminiscent of Miyazaki’s (2013) arbitrageurs—optimistically seeking to shape the world
through finance even as the world changes around them and undermines their professional practice. His reflections
also echoed the sentiments documented by High (2019, 41), whose oil workers regarded fossil fuels as a “force for
good” and a cause for moral conviction in a world dependent on hydrocarbons but increasingly anxious about their
contribution to climate change.
Since mid-2019, some of my interlocutors have commented that PE was perhaps not “money well spent” after
all. While the United States produced more oil and gas than it had for more than half a century, and some people
made billions, many investors and companies lost money as the most recent stage of the shale revolution came to a
close. Some small- to medium-sized firms have since dissolved, while large PE firms have begun consolidating and
reorganizing their portfolio companies, hoping to survive the downturn. The surge of investor capital into financially
high-risk, high-reward oil and gas PE created “overdrilling,” interlocutors now told me. This activity helped depress
US crude oil and gas prices, scuttling investor profits. Acting on their perceived responsibility to aggressively “derisk”
unconventional hydrocarbon E&P, PE financiers exhausted the profits that could be earned from these activities.
One message that can be gleaned from this is that in the process of fulfilling their responsibilities to derisk oil assets
for investors, PE financiers collectively contributed to a classic crisis in overproduction—one that stretched the
United States’ landlocked oil infrastructure to its limits (Harvey [1982] 2006; High and Field 2020; Labban 2008).
Some non-PE interlocutors I know, in part, blamed PE financiers for ushering in the “bust” in the US oil and gas
sector—even though, for more than a decade, these financiers were the risk-taking stars of the industry who helped
revitalize US onshore production, to the applause of investors.
While this has ended, the surge of capital from PE has ensured that hydrocarbon consumption in the United
States will extend well into the future by contributing to low hydrocarbon prices and widespread availability of fossil
fuels, even as the industry experiences a contraction. Far from contributing to a “wrong turn,” as Reuter (2021, 176)
suggests, Arthur, Kyle, and others I know take solace in contributing to American and global petrocapitalism by
providing its “lifeblood” (Huber 2013). They could not have done this, however, without the financial backing of
institutional investors. PE, as such, may be understood not only as a conduit for capital but also as a social conduit
of responsibility—a way for investors to harness the financial benefits of hydrocarbon E&P, while outsourcing the
blame for any potential losses and adverse social and environmental outcomes (Ortiz 2013). As Souleles (2019,
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187–88) contends, PE financiers form a powerful yet underresearched “interstitial” conduit for money within a
larger financial system to which we are all connected.
Conclusion
The accounts of Arthur, Kyle, and others provide an occasion to reflect on how financiers are empowered with the
responsibility to define and take risks on our collective behalf through institutional investors. They also provide an
opportunity to reflect on how capital from institutional investors shapes our energy worlds. While a new phase of
the US shale revolution may be upon us, unconventional hydrocarbon extraction and the PE finance that fueled it
are unlikely simply to disappear. There is no turning back the clock on the transformative effect that PE has had on
US energy production, the communities where extraction occurs, the lives it has affected, or the landscapes it has
transformed.
Unconventional extraction unleashed a wave of new energy possibilities that cannot be unlearned or unimag-
ined. Interlocutors I know in Houston’s PE community attest that it is their responsibility to seize financial
opportunities in the hydrocarbon sector for a kind of greater good—a kind of capitalistic energy ethics (High and
Smith 2019). The directions of our energy presents and futures, I have shown, have as much to do with technological
innovation as they do with how these innovations are financed and with the forward-looking moral ambitions of
financiers to take financial risks. One PE interlocutor I know, who is a managing director at a large reputable firm,
told me that his firm is now looking for financial opportunities in renewable energy sources, although he admitted
that his firm’s inquiry into renewables is exploratory at the present time. Oil and gas PE thrives on matching
investment risks with high investment returns. If the capitalistic conditions are right, the next energy “revolution”
may only be a technological innovation and a price cycle away, and interlocutors I know see it as their responsibility
to exploit it.
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Notes
1 Institutional investors are organizations with aggregated pools of capital, such as pension funds, hospital trusts, university endowments, and insurance
companies.
2 “E&P” refers to finding, drilling, and producing hydrocarbons.
3 Gaseous hydrocarbons tend to be less monetarily valuable than crude oil.
4 I am a member of two industry associations, which I joined in 2019 while conducting fieldwork.
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5 Loans given to E&P companies were typically for less than twelve months and based on the net worth of the borrower, including the value of oil in storage
and in transit (Clark 2016).
6 Kyle told me that he relies on people with twenty to thirty years of experiential knowledge in a particular location (interview, January 22, 2019).
7 According to Clark (2016), a few generalist PE firms became involved in the US hydrocarbon sector in the mid-twentieth century, but it was not their sole
focus.
8 Fifty-two of these ninety PE firms collectively fund-raised $68.7 billion between 2003 and 2013 (Haines 2013a).
9 EnCap’s first upstream fund-raised $20 million in 1988.
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